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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STEEL COMPONENTS,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vsUNITED STATES FIDELITY
AND GUARANTY COMPANY,
a corp.,
Defendant and Appellant

Case No.

12509

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a statutory bond action brought by a labor
and material supplier under the public works, "little
Miller" act. The prime contractor Cox made a sub-contract with Facilities, Inc. which orally engaged plaintiff
to supply labor. Facilities became insolvent; and because
of difficulties, Cox Construction Co. engaged in direct
contractual relations with plaintiff. Plaintiff gave the
required 90 day billings and notices to the prime contractor who did not pay, hence this action was brought
on the bond.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant-appellant moved for summary judgment;
plaintiff-respondent filed a counter-motion for summary
judgment based on discovery and uncontested affidavits
which resulted in a judgment in plaintiff's favor.
·RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant desires this court to affirm the
judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April 1969 Cox Construction Company of Richfield, Utah entered into a construction contract with the
Utah State Road Commission for building of a bridge
over the DRGRR on Utah highway 89 about five miles
north of Fairview, San Pete County as well as about
seven miles of highway. The bid price thereof approximated $900,000 and Cox was bonded for said job by
defendant-appellant United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company. The contract consists of three documents
on file herein.
Exhibit "A" attached to the complaint shows the
abstract of the signed contract, and Exhibit "B" is the
form of the bond in effect (R. 4, 5) and on which this
action is predicated, along with the Utah bond statute.
Cox Construction Co., hereinafter called "Cox"
entered a sub-contract with Facilities Inc., hereinafter
called "Facilities", for a part of the work. At page 2 of
defendant's brief it admits that F'acilities entered a,
verbal contract with this plaintiff to do a very small
portion of the work on the bridge, there admitting
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"certain work" was done by plaintiff. At no time did
plaintiff know the terms or conditions of the basic contracts with the road commisson, Cox or Facilities, its
initial arrangment being for labor only at an agreed
cost of $2,800.00.
About October 16, 1969 plaintiff-respondent started
its work on the bridge only to find that the materials
supplied by Cox would not fit because of the "haphazzard" manner in which the concrete had been earlier
poured; it would not receive the corregated sheet steel
and the "angle clips'' would not fit. Because fundamental changes in the work and material had to be made,
plaintiff left the job and did not return until Tom Gross,
expeditor and superintendent on the bridge job for Cox,
authorized plaintiff to get new longer angle clips and
cut the steel to fit, Cox agreeing directly to pay plaintiff
on a new plan for completion of the work. (R. 83, 84)
Thereupon plaintiff did the work which consisted of
"the construction of forming, decking, and scaffolding,
on the bridge structure to later receive the concrete and
steel reinforcing for the bridge spans between piers".
(See Request for Admissions No. 26 on page 22 of the
record, admitted on page 70 of the record.) Thus plaintiff engaged in direct contractual relations with Cox.
Cox had difficulties with Facilities during the times
above set forth and Facilities went bankrupt. On page
6 of defendant's brief it admits Facilities took out bankruptcy. At nu time before or after did Facilities do any
supervision. (R. 83). Supervision was done by Cox. (R.

81, Req. 27 F. P. 23, 71).
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Upon completion of plaintiff's work, plaintiff
properly billed Cox within the 90 day stipulation of the
bonding statute thus preserving all of its rights to pursue payment under the "Little Miller Act", 14-1-5 to 12
inclusive, UCA as amended. Cox ignored such requests
for payment of labor and materials, hence plaintiff sued
defendant on its bond pursuant to the said statute. It
has never been contested but that plaintiff gave the
statutory notices timely.
Cox later filed an action in the District Court for
Salt Lake County after the instant action by plantiff
was commenced and tried to effect a consolidation of the
two suits into Salt Lake County; but because of the
mandatory provision of 14-1-6 UCA that the action on
the bond be brought only in San Pete County, the county
where the work was performed, the court refused such
consolidation. (R. 41) The Salt Lake County action is
mute as long as this action is pending.
Extensive discovery was engaged in by plaintiff in
the nature of Requests for Admission which were
answered, not by the defendant USF&G but by one
of the Cox brothers. He did not give his responses
under oath as required by Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the whole, the responses were highly
evasive; but sufficient admissions were specifically given
to establish the basic nature of the plaintiff's work, (R.
22 No. 26; answers at P. 70); and that no criticism has
ever been leveled by Cox at plaintiff's performance, (R.
20 at Request 12, and page 70 for admission); and that
appropriate billing was effected within 90 days of plain- 4-

tiff's completion of its work thus enabling plaintiffrepondent to bring its direct action on the bond.
Defendant made a motion for summary judgment
(R. 51). Plaintiff thereafter and before hearing served

several affidavits on defendant, none of which were ever
controverted; and plaintiff made its counter motion for
summary judgment against defendant (R. 74) based on
the discovery, affidavits, pleadings, etc. which resulted
in the judgment in plaintiff's favor from which this
appeal is taken. Defendant engaged in no discovery, and
filed two affidavits the thrust thereof being: (1) Cecil
Cox said at no time did he as president give his consent
to Facilities making a sub-contract with plaintiff (R. 53),
and (2) Russell Talbot, project engineer for the State
Road Commission stated no certified copy of the pay
roll of Facilities nor of this plaintiff had been filed. (R.
54). Scott Helm, president of plaintiff gave affidavit
that he had no knmdedge of any prohibition against subcontracting or of any n'qui i'"rnent to fil<' payroll reports.
(R. 86) Defendant's hrit>f misleads the court at page 7

when it states that th<• Cox affidavit included language
that "Cox did not contract with Steel Components."
There is no such langauge at page 53 of the record. This
same Cecil Cox admitted that new angle clips were
delivered to the job (Req. 28) and were welded into the
bridge under "the direct supervision of Cox." (Req. 27F,
P. 23 of record, the answers being at P. 72). The angle
clips problem was near the first of plaintiff's work to
be done. (R. 81).
-5-

'l'he motions for summary judgment were extensively argued and briefed resulting in the court entering
its Order in favor of plaintiff on its "counter motion for
summary judrnent." (R. 124) The formal judgment is
at page 121 of the record. The parties briefs are at pages
88, 9-1-, and 111 of tlw record.
A supervisor of the State Road Commission accounting, contracts office certified the project was 99% completed and that Cox had been paid $824,618 prior to the
entry of judgment (R. 75, 80). Cox argued in its brief
that no payment had been made plaintiff: (1) because
Cox had never authorized Facilities to sub-contract any
of the work, and (2) that plaintiff had failed to file pay
roll reports of which plaintiff was ignorant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR RECOVERY ON THE BOND FOR LABOR AND
MATERIALS FURNISHED WERE ESTABLISHED
ON THE RECORD.

Plaintiff's initial contribution to the project was
solely that of proYiding laboi-. Defendant's brief properly
described the contract with plaintiff as "verbal". When
about 25% along with its work, plaintiff discovered it
could not continue because of the "hap-hazzard way in
which the concrete had been poured before plaintiff
entered the job; that fundamental changes in the work
... had to be agreed upon." (R. 81, 83) The further
uncontested evidence says that relations at this time were
straigned between Cox and Facilities. Plaintiff's crew
-6-

had been pulled completely off the job. The impasse was
only resolved when Tom Gross, superintendent for Cox
arranged with the president of plaintiff to procure new
"angle clips" that would fit, would receive and hold the
concrete later to be poured by Cox ( R. 81, 83). Also the
corrugated sheets on which the concrete was to be poured
had to be cut down to size because of changed dimensions
in the work earlier done. Helm desired to make these
new arrangments with one of the Cox brothers, but Tom
Gross stated this was his job to be the "go-between",
that Cox was too "Hot-headed". (R. 83, 84) As a result
of these confrontations, plaintiff supplied new angle
clips at the specific request of Cox, and which Cox had
agreed specifically to pay for, together with the cutting
and emplacing of the altered sheet steel into the structure
to receive concrete later. It is clear from the affidavit
of Helm that the ''new plan" proposed by Plaintiff to
Cox was adopted, and Cox agreed "to pay" which constituted, in the language of the bond statute, direct contractual relations with the prime contractor. 14-1-6 UCA
as amended. Defendant and Cox had ample opportunity
to dispute or deny these crucial affidavits but they
remained silent and do not contest them to this day!
While defendant hedged in many of its answers to
requests for admissions, the fundamental contribution of
plaintiff is admitted in request No. 26 as follows:
The general nature of the work accomplished
by plaintiff on the project ... was the construction of forming, decking and scaffolding on the
bridge structure to later receive the concrete and
steel reinforcing for the bridge spans between
piers. (R.22, admitted R. 70)
-7-

Further, the breakdown on the job occurred when
three-fourths of the work remained and could not be done
by plaintiff because the angle clips did not fit and the
sheet steel would not fit between the bridge girders. (R.
81, 83) The requests for admissions "pierced" the allegations of defendant's answers, and defendant did not
controvert, explain or destroy the fundamental evidence
before the court by counter-affidavits or otherwise.
Much of what it gave was subterfuge and this, not under
oath. (R. 72, 73) The responses "should be sworn to by
the party, himself." Moore, Federal Practice, Vol. 4,
2714) In predicating its refusal to answer requests 27A
by saying it did not know any "Tom", (R. 70) the court
had a right to believe Cox was not telling the truth. The
head contracting officer for the State Road Commission
gave clear affidavit, uncontradicted, that the two supervisors on the project were both named "Tom", one being
Tom Gross. (R. 75, 78) Plaintiff's vice-president was
uncontradicted in his affidavit that said person "was
the principal foreman or superintendent on the project
... Said Gross had full authority on the job so far as
Cox was concerned. I never met anyone else in authority
from the Cox company." (R. 81) In the face of these
admissions and failures to contradict plaintiff's affidavits there were no "material facts" remaining to be
tried as set forth in Rule 56 ( d). There was no good
reason for further delay.
It is unimportant to draw a fine line between those
portions of the work done under verbal-subcontract with
Facilities, and those done under direct relations with
Cox, for plaintiff gave the requisite billings covering its
-8-

work to Cox within the 90 days required in said bonding
statute.
The difficulty with angle clips furnished by Cox
tbat didn't fit and the refusal of plaintiff to proceed
until a new plan was adopted, as clearly stated by plaintiff's president, and never disputed by Cox or defendant,
is further irrevocably clarified: Exhibit "I" was related
to billing for the 700 new angle clips. (R. 29, 30) Asked
in Request 27D if defendant would have any dispute as
to the contents of Exhibit "I", defendant responded;
"The documents speak for themselves." (R. 22,71)
And nmv comes the request and admission that
clinches the favorabl<-' decision of the court in its
judgment:
27F rnll' angle clips described in Exhibit ''I" and
its
1\·ere welded into the bridge
strndur0 descrilwd in Exhibit
hy plaintiff
in early November 1969 under th:' direct supervision of Cox Construction Company. (R. 23)
Answer, "TruP" (R. 71)
The uncontradicted affidavit of Trujillo shows that
the installation of "angle clips" was one of the first
things to be accomplished, and pointed up the futility of
plaintiff trying to do its work without a "new plan"
·which Cox specifically agreed to. (R 81, 83)
In the section of Exhibit "M" of the written contract
between Cox and Facilities quoted at page 5 of defendant's brief, please note that assignmen1:s or sub-letting
may be done only with permission of Cox. Within the
first days of plaintiff's work it was clear that the con-9-

piers would not receive the steel material suppiled
by Cox. Plaintiff took its men off the job, and only
resumed when the Helm new plan was agreed to by Cox's
superintendent 'rom Gross. (R. 83, 84) Cox waived its
right to demand written consent and must be estopped
to now raise such a specious bar. The supervision by Cox
is fully admitted in Request for Admission No. 27F at
page 23 of the record and its admissions at page 71.
CORP. OF PRESIDENT LDS CHURCH v.
HARFORD, 95 P. 2 73G: 98 U 287.
It was Cox's privilege to oust Facilities, Inc. from
the job, according to the written contract between them,
and "contract with 0 1ther parties for its completion." (R.
60) Now that Cox had eliminated Facilities, and availed
itself of plaintiff, it should not lie in the mouth of Cox
or its surety to raise issues collateral to the main purpose of the engagement to bar recovery on the bond. The
purpose of plaintiff on the job was to install steel to
receive concrete and get it done quickly before freezing
weather. Plaintiff did this, and without criticism. There
was no time nor occasion for plaintiff to go on a side
trip to determine ancilliary provisions of two long and
extraneous contracts.

·The Utah Bond Statute 14-1-5(2) is "solely for the
protection of persons supplying labor or materials to
the contractor or his sub-contractors in the prosecution
of the work . . . " In CAMPBELL BLDG. CO. v.
DISTRICT COURT 90 U 552, 63 P. 2 255, this court
stated:
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The bond required by the statute to be given
by the contractor is for the purpose of protecting
mechanics and materialmen ... This statute is
highly remedial for the benefit of and to provide
security for all persons who furnish labor and
materials on public work.
This court also said in UTAH BUILDING BOARD v.
WALSH PLUMBING 399 P.2 141, 16 U 2d, 249,
1965: "The terms of the bond should be construed
strictly against Industrial Indemnity as the paid surety
who furnished it." The court :then gives the purpose of
the bond, not alone to protect the laborer and material
man, but:
The fundamental one was but to carry out the
overall objective of constructing and delivering a
debt-free building.
The Utah court also stated a principle applicable
to the argument that failure to file the weekly reports
should def eat recovery on the bond:
. . . where a contract such as this requires the
giving of a notice, unless the failure to give it in
some way puts a party to a disadvantage or adversley affect his rights he should not be permitted to evade his just obligations under the
contract because of a mere technical failure to
give notice.
This coul't in CORPORATION OF THE LDS
CHURCH v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
95 P. 2 736, 98 1T '.297 1939 upheld the surety
bond stating: "Something in the nature of an estoppel
closes the mouth of the Surety :to question too closely
the legal nature of the relations between the Church
-
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and the contractor ... "In the case at bar, defendant was
a paid surety, and it must be estopped to question technical relations beyond the simple question of whether the
labor and materials were actually furnished.
Said case also discusses a wavier doctrine applicable
here. When Cox knew of the contract provisions, supervised plaintiff and had direct contract rela;tions with
plaintiff without advising labor reports were necessary,
a waiver has been effected, and estoppel shuts defendant's mouth to now raise such an issue. These points
were all before the court before its decision. (R. 98).
Defendant's brief admits: "We do not question
Steel Component's right to file under the bonding
statute, but we question its right to recover." (Br. P. 4)
Counsel has not cited nor ref ered to nor apparently
understood the plain inport of the Utah bonding statute
on public works. (14-1-6 UCA) Had plaintiff failed to
make proof, given the written notices to Cox within 90
days of its last work, then defendant might have room
to argue ·that a portion of the money due must come from
the deposit in the District Court for Salt Lake County.
But such is not the case. The right to full money direct
from the bonding company is bottomed on two distinct
fact situations:
(1) The firHt quarter to a third of the work was
done pursuant to verbal contract with Facilities. The
above statute requires plaintiff to give Cox written
notice of such claim within 90 days of its doing its last
work, otherwise i t may. not recover from the
company. Exhibit "C" on page 6 of the record is a bill
1
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for $2,800 covering the work verbally agreed to and performed. Because Facilities was in dangerous condition,
plaintiff sent the leHer dated November 14, 1969,
Exhibit "D ", together with a copy of the $2,800 billing
Exhibit "C" to Cox (R. 7); and by admissions number
16 to 20 inclusive there cannot be the slightest doubt but
that Cox received such "written notice" required by said
statute. (R. 70) All conditions precedent to recover
from the building company for the verbal contract with
:F'acilities have thus been fully met.
(2) Because of the "hap-hazzard way in which the
concrete had been poured . . . fundamental changes in
the work to be done by the plaintiff had to be made,
agreed upon . . . Tlw bridge girdPrs were improperly
spaced." (R. 83, 84-) Cox engaged in direct contractual
relations with plaintiff to get plaintiff back on the job,
get new anglP clips, get thP eorrugatt•d steel cut dmvn to
installable size and this before free7.ing weather would
preclude pouring the concrete. (R. 83, 84) Exhibits "E,
F and G" on vag('S
9 and 10 of tlH' record are the
balance of the billings for the direct labor performed.
Defendant acknowledged it had received all of these
exhibits, C, D, E, F, and G, they being billings and d0mands for payment. (See request No. 38 at page 24 of
record, the answer being "True" as shown at page 71
thereof). The office manager of Cox showed plaintiff's
president these originals as they lay in the Cox files!
Exhibit "F" (R. 9) was a direct billing to Cox dated
November 17, 1969 and was sent on the same date. (R.
R4) Cox admitted especifically that it had received
-
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Exhibit "G" (R. 10) dated November 19, 19G9 by
n'gistered mail. (R. Req. 33 on page 24 and admitted at
page 71.) To further prove plaintiff was doing everything within its power, within those requisite 90 days
from completion, note Exhibit "J" (R. 31) was written
as a complaint to the Utah Department of Contractors.
It recites the written notices given Cox and the letter as
well was written before the expiration of 90 days from
the last of the work done . Vice president Trujillo of
Plaintiff made his uncontradicted affidavit that the
work commenced on October 16, 1969 and required six
weeks to complete. (R. 81) Plaintiff alleged the work
was completed about November 22, 1969; (R. 16) but
while defendant denied this allegation, it did not contradict the Trujillo affidavit. There can be no doubt but
that 90 days from November 22, 1969 would permit the
"written notices" to be given Cox down to about
February 21 1970 or even the end of February that year.
These elements, fundamental to plaintiff's position, were
discussed by counsel before the trial court on the motions
for summary judgment and accepted by the court in its
judgment for plaintiff. They are recited here only to
prove that all of the conditions precedent under the bond
statute were met by plaintiff. Cox never questioned or
denied timely receipt of the "written notices". It's
evidence in the case is in two affidavits that involve
other irrelevant subjects. (R. 53, 54) No issues of fact
essential to the judgment for plaintiff existed. It was
and is uncontested that plaintiff furnished labor and
material on the public project for which it was not paid,
and it gave the requisite written billings and notices to
-14-

Cox within 90 <lays of the last of the work being done.
Plaintiff has sustained its burden of proof on the essentials of recovery on the bond.
DE LUXE GLASS v. -MARTIN, 208 P. 2
1127; 116 u 144.
POINT IL
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BOUND BY A CONTRACT
OF WHICH IT KNOWS NOTHING.

Defendant argues in its points II and V that plaintiff is barred from recovery for labor and material
furnished because: (1) the contract between Cox and
Facilities forbad a third-tier sub-contract without Cox's
consent, and (2) the failure of Facilities and/or plaintiff
to file pay-roll reports defeats recovery under the bond.
Neither of these propositions are tenable and are contrary to law.
In the first place, the uncontradicted affidavit of
Scott Helm states plaintiff at no time was advised by
anyone of the existence of the langauge forbiding subcontracting, and of any requirement of making weekly
pay-roll reports. (R. 86) No person should or can be
charged with language of which he is ignorant. Neither
Defendant or Cox ever suggested plaintiff was familiar
with any such prohibitions, regulations. Cox and Facilities, being in full knowledge of such measures and not
disclosing them, are es topped to raise such a bar now.

The prime contract between Cox and the Road Commission consist of three documents not bound into the
-15-

record. The blue book is the basic contract and on Sheet
'
#l which follows the unit prices (about 15 pages in) the
Special Provision is stated that the "Standard Specifications, Interim Issue, March 1968 and Supplement No. 1,
will apply to this project." The latter refers to the two
smaller, gray-covered volumes in the record. The prohibition against sub-letting or assigning without the
express approval of the road commission is stated on
page 38 of the larger gray volume. Plaintiff comes late to
the knowledge of this language. But note the final sentence in said prohibition, for in all events, the road commission, under the provisions of the statutory language
of the bond, saves the rights of material and labor
suppliers:
''No subcontracts or transfer of contract shall
release the contractor of his liability under the
contract and bonds."
Cox bound itself with Facilities to these same provisions.
Hence, it must be said that even though Cox and/or
Facilities did wrong in sub-contracting or allowing
plaintiff to enter the job, the above saving language on
page 38 of the Standard Specifications for Road and
Bridge Construction saves the bond provision in favor of
a labor and material supplier.
This saving provision is necessary because of the
Utah statute 14-1-12 which states:

All provisions in any invitation for bids, or in
any of the contract documents in conflict with
this act are hereby declared to be void wn.d unenf orceable as contrary to the public policy of· this
state.
-16-

ln other word:s, 80 long as the payment required in
14-1-5(2) is in effect, the material or labor :supplier shall
recover on the bond provided the conditions precedent
stated in 14-1-6 are complied with. There is no evidence
nor argument to the contrary, or that the statutory conditions precedent have not been met. The federal
regulations do not
to this plaintiff. The arguments of defendant's brief are ipsi dixit. No other law
than that of the Utah bonding statute applies. (See 72
CJS 517)
The Utah bonding cases cited in the first section of
this brief are all apposite here and will not be restated.
The point No. 1 argued in defendant's brief that the
liability of tlw surety is co-equal with liability of the
contract is not ahvays true. Such is stated in the second
senten<'e of the provision quoted by defendant in 17 A.T
2d #52. The rights of laborers and materialmen are independent of the right of the public body under the bond.
rr'he condition for payment of laborers and materialnwn
is inserted for an entirely different purpose from that of
securing to the public body the performance of the contract ... "

In NATIONAL SURETY CO. v. LIME CO., 92 P.
1111, Kan. 1907 that court hdd that the supplier of
material must have actwal knowledge of illegalities. In
the case now on appeal, counsel would bar plaintiff from
its statutory rP,covery on the bond on the theory that
immaterial parts of contracts between the State, Cox and
Facilities, of which plaintiff was ignorant, are still bind-17-

mg on plaintiff. Note what the Kansas court above
stated:
As against the Surety company, nothing short
of actual knowledge of the illegal contrad, and
of the_ fraudulent steps by which it was procured,
can Lmd the pla111L11
who sold the material
on the secmity of the bond given by the Surety
Company. It must be a lmowlcdgc so ample
and complete that those who contribute labor or
material in furtherance of the unlawful eontract
can be regarded as active agents in promoting the
fraud and illegality. (emphasis added)
The above case was cited in S'l'ANDARD ASPHALT &
RUBBER v. T.l£XAS BLDG. 1G2 P. 299, also a Kansas
case in 1917 stating the following:
LabonTs an<l lilaterial men have rights under
tl1i:3 statuto1·y bond incle1wndent ol the obligee.
At 17 Am. Jur. 2d, #55 it is stated:
As a general rule, the surety on the bond of a
eontnwtor for public ·work, conditioned for the
payment of claims for labor and material used
in the work, Yvill not be pennjtted to set up the
fact that the contract between the public body and
the contractor was invalid or irregular, to defeat
the claims of laborers and materialmen for labor
and material furnished to the contractor, unless
it appears that such laborers or materialmen have
been guilty of procuring an illegal awarding of
the contract and are therefore estopped from
enforcing the bond. The surities have held
themselves out as responsible for the validity of ·
the contract to persons having a right to rely
upon the security which the bond is designed to
afford. They should not, as a matter of abstract
justice, be permitted to deny liability.
-18-

In CENTRAL STEEL ERE'CTION CO. v. WILL
AND LAR8EN, (WILLAH) 304: F2 54:8, the 9th Circuit
Court in 19()2 was met in a suit by a sub-contractor
against the bonding company for labor and material
furnished with the same defense as here, the argument
being that because labor time sheets had not been
furnished, the bonding company was not liable on the
bond. "Not so", said the 9th Circuit:
\Ve find no basis for this contention, for the
record does not show any contract provision
requiring Willar to furnish or keep copie8 of
invoicPs or labor.
This was a Miller Act case. The same provision argued
for by defendant in the case at bar was in effect in the
'Villar case that ... "each contractor and subcontractor
shall furnish weekly a sworn affidavit with respect to
the wages paid each employPe during the proceding
week." (See Laws of 81st Congress 1st Session, 194:9,
page 114:). The Willar case, as here, did not involve any
question but that the work was done in a satisfactory
manner. The court thus refused to def eat the bonding
protection for failure to file reports that have a different
function.
F ANDERLIK-LOCKE CO. v US, 285 F2d 939,
1960 is a 10th OCA case by a sub-contractor against the
bonding
where the prime contract employed
administrative procedures of submitting the controversy
to the Contracting Officer rather than direct suit on the
bond.
The purpose of the Miller Act is to provide
security for those who furnish labor and material
-
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in the performance of government contracts and
a libe1;llil construction should /Je given . . . to
accomplish this purpose ... 'l'he benefits of the
Act are not intended for the prime contractor who
is required by the Act to furnish a bond to
effectuate its provisions ... there is no contract
express or implied between the sub-contractor
and the government ... The remedy for one seeking to recover for labor and materials furnished
on a govennent contract is under the Miller Act,
and ordinarily the fact that a prime contractor
has a claim for the same amounts pending under
the 'disputes clause' of the prime contract, does
not affect Miller Act cases. It appears that ...
when a sub-contractor's claim was being litigated,
the administrative proceeding pertaining to the
corresponding claim made by the prime contractor would, in many instances, be delayed until
there was a determination of the prime contractor's liability . . . If Morgan is limited to the
presentation of his claim as provided in the 'disputes clause' of the prime contract, he has
surrendered his right to the benefits of the
.Miller Act provisions.
The sanctions for failure to observe the provisions
of the Davis-Bacon Act (which are argued by defendant
in Point V of its brief) are not punishment of an innocent third-tier sub-contractor, but either "termination
of the contract" by the governmental agency, or "debarment" which means the prime contractor shall be precluded from further contracts with the government for
as long as three years. At page 9 of defendant's brief
reference and a quote is made to Form 1273, it being
regulations that may pertain to federal-aid highway
construction. Defendant does not cite where in the
-20-

record said rcgnlat:ons l1Wy be found, but it was before
the court at Id anti rel<·1 n·d to by the parties. Plaintiff has procurred sufficient copies of Form 1273 so as
to bind the red copy into this brief for reference. It is
therein that the requinncnt for filling weekly payroll
reports is stated. But attention is called to the sanctions
therein stated. They
fierce as against the prime
contractor.
On page 1 thereof, Section 1, APPLICATION, under
paragraphs 3 and-±, the remedy for "breach of any of the
stipulations in these required contract provisions" is
first, "grounds for termination of the contract." And
secondly, the bre::i.ch may result in the prime contractor
being "debarred" from further contracts with the
government for as long as three years. See the citation
at 29 CFR 5.G (b) in No. 4 which should be consulted if
the point is seriously taken that the ignorant small subcontractor might be punished. In 29 CFR 5.6(b) section
1, paragraph 1 and 2, the regulation shows that it is
aimed at an "aggravated or willfid violation of the labor
standards" in the Davis-Bacon Act, and that the government may "black-ball" the violating prime contractor.
In sertion II, sub-paragraph 3-e, on page 2 thereof,
are stated the SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE.
These include "withholding of payments to the contractor until the contractor complies" and "cancellation,
termination or suspension of the contract ... "
In section V, STATEMENTS AND PAYROLLS,
after stating the r.ontractor or subcontractor "shall
furnish each week a statement ... ",etc. it reads:
-
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"3. Final Labor Summary: The contractor and each
subcontractor shall furnish, upon the completion of the
contract, a summary of all employment ... " The job has
not been completed, 1 % of the work remains. (R 75, 80)
In sub-section 5d of V it is stated:
The prime contractor shall be responsible for
the submission of copies of payrolls of all subcontractors. The contractor will make the records
required ... "

There is nothing in this case that shows Cox has made
any demand on plaintiff for payroll records. All that is
clear is that defendant has tried to use this regulation as
a means of voiding the bonding recovery of a material
and labor supplier. If it had any genuine interest in the
subject of the Davis Bacon Act, it would have employed
discovery procedures into plaintiffs' piddling labor force
to see if it was underpaid, or whether there was discrimination or false deductions for political or other
purposes. The purpose back of the Davis-Bacon Act are
stated at page 109 of the record at avoiding "kickbacks,
discriminations, minimum wages, etc. and not to punish
nn innocent small supplier of labor, materials who failed
to give a notice. This court in UTAH STATE BUILDING v. WALSH, 16 U. 2d 249, 399 P. 2d 141 refused the
same defense of a bonding company stating the latter was
evading "his just obhgation" by raising such a bar.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
INTERPLEDE THIS BOND ACTION INTO THE
SALT LAKE COUNTY SUIT BY COX.

Plaintiff labors on page 4 of its brief the inter-
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pleader action in Salt Lake County and that the obligation incident to plaintiff may be paid twice, once by the
bonding company and again by Cox. This is all beside
the point. The bond action must be brought in the county
vvhere the project was constructed, San Pete County, and
there it is. Cox undertook two and one-half months
after the instant action was filed there to bring certain
creditors into another action in Salt Lake Cotmty. It
deposited a fund and asked the creditors to fight for all
they could get; the USF&G bonding company against
whom plaintiff has prime statutory rights, was not, and
could not be a party to the Salt Lake County suit! It is
singular that in Cox's allegations, it names this plaintiff
mnong others, but states Cox "is without information ...
a::: to \\-hether said claims arise out of the above contract
... or whether they are proper claims ... and denies
that said claims are proper claims against plaintiff" (R.
43) Cox would like to compell plaintiff as a labor and
material supplier to substitute its vested right to recover
under that bond for an inchoate scale-down of a portion
of the $81/z thousand deposited. To add insult, Cox
asked that its
be paid out of that fund! (R. 46)

It is easy to see why the trial court refused the
motion to
Counsel should quit arguing
about consolidation, for to consider that subject is to
substitute an indeterminate share of a diminishing
fund among creditors who did not give "written notice"
under the bonding statute for the vested right in plaintiff
under the bond statute; and if plaintiff succeeds all the
way, defendant will be required to pay attorney fees
-23-

according to 14-1-8 UCA as amended. An affirmed
judgment will be resjudicata as to plaintiff.
POINT IV.
ANY PORTION OF PLAINTIFF'S WORK NOT
AGREED UPON WITH COX SHOULD BE PAID
FOR ON BASIS OF QUANTUM MERUIT.

From the uncontested affidavit of Trujillo it is clear
that the angle clips "were the first items to be installed
before we could erect other materials ... " (R. 81) It is
clear the angle clips originally supplied would not fit
"because of the way the concrete had been poured ... ''
(R. 83) Plaintiff had probably first erected scaffolding
in preparation for its steel work on and under the bridge
girders when the materials would be made to fit. Plaintiff pulled its men from the job about a quarter of the
way along only to have Tom Gross renegotiate the relationship with the final, undisputed words that, "Mr. Cox
desired plaintiff to go forward on the plan I (Helm
president) had suggested and procure the clips and Cox
would pay." It is hair-splitting of no consequence to say
this principal
should he paid for in quantum
meruit. Plaintiff was content to timely bill Cox direct
for the $2,800 that Facilities had agreed to pay. (R. 6,
7) The balance of the billings are probably in the nature
of quantum meruit for they had been specifically authorized as billed in Exhibit "F" for "Extra cutting of deck
and welding of extra angle clips to support perimeter
angle" as authorized by Gross (R. 83, 84). The "Back ·
charge" bill, Exhibit "G" (R. 10) is in addition to the
agreed price with Facilities and represent charges compensible under quantum meruit. The only other bill is
-
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for $105 to Hulbert Brothers for the 700 angle clips
specifically requested by Tom Gross for which he said
Cox would pay. These items total the sum of $3,245
which is the amount of the judgment before interest,
costs. (R. 121)
Never has Cox contested the amount of the charges.
lt and defendant have always tried to avoid payment by
the bonding company solely on the two theories elsewhere argued that Facilities had no right to a third-tier
contract with plaintiff, and that plaintiff did not file
labor reports, and hence cannot recover. vV e submit it
is not the amounts that are in contest but soley whether
plaintiff should recover anything from defendant bonding company. To remand for further proceedings on
quantum meruit would simply entail more delay and
build up plaintiff's attorney fees under the statute.
POINT V.
THE COURT HAD AUTHORITY TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT.

Again counsel for defendant would mislead the court
m writing on page 12 of his brief that "Plaintiff and
Respondent made an oral motion for summary judgment
which was objected to by the defendant for lack of
sufficient notice." The record is to the contrary.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was
noticed for January 28, 1971 (R. 68) and hearing was
had on that date. The answers to plaintiff's request for
admissions arrived sometime after mailing on January
13, 1971 (R. 73) and thus became, together with affi-
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davits immediately to be produced, the basis for plaintiff's written Counter Motion for Summary Judgment,
personally served on defendant January 25, 1971 together
with the several affidavits, not one of which was ever
challenged. Thus counsel misleads the court in stating in
effect that only an oral motion was made on the hearing
date.
Rule 56c requires the initial movent (defendant
here) to give at least ten days notice; but the rule
permits the "adverse party prior to the day of hearing"
to serve opposing affidavits, and this was done by
plaintiff, together with the written notice of his intention
to concurrently ask for summary judgment.
TRIPP v . .MAY, CCA 7th, 189 F2 198 discusses this
procedure, also adverting to 3 Barron & Holtzoff, #1239
which conclusively disposes of defendant's Point VI.
Said Barron & Holtzoff at page 178 states:
In a nonjury case if both parties move for
summary judgment and the court finds that there
are issues of fact but that the facts have been
fully developed at the hearing on the motions, the
court may proceed to decide the factual issues and
give judgment on the merits ... It is usually held
that since the purpose of this procedure is to
expedite the disposition of the case, a summary
judgment may be rendered against the party
moving for judgment and in favor of the opposing
party although the latter has rnade no crossrnotion for ,j11dgment.

In 6 Moore, Federal Procedure starting at page
2241, the subject is exhaustively treated.
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"The great weight of authority ... dispenses
with the formality of a cross-motion for summary
judgment."
Defendant had sufficient notice ahead of the hearing,
three days, so it was not subjected to surprise as to
plaintiff's intentions.
SUMMARY
Plaintiff had the burden to prove all conditions
precedent had been fulfilled under the bond statute of
Utah, the only source of authority under the bond. It
satisfied that burden. The requests for admission and
affidavits "pierced" the subterfuge employed by defendant and Cox and left no issue of substance requiring
trial. Plaintiff supplied material and labor to a bonded
state project and was not paid. Within 90 days it gave
the requisite notices. It had a vested right to judgment
as a subcontractor for part of the work and for direct
contractual relations v.rith the prime contractor. It had
in both instances the power to sue on the bond. The
judgment should not be disturbed.
Respectfully,
W. C. Lamoreaux
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
September 15, 1971
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ped"ormed under a

sub<..-onttact, l.ncJuding procurements

materials or

leases of equipment, each potenti.il subcontractor, ;upplier, or lessor shall
be notified by the contractor of the contractor's obligations under this

contract and the Regulations relative to nondiscrimination on the ground
of race, color or national origin.
d. Information and Reports: The contractor will provide all information and reports required by the Regulations, or orders and instructions
issued pursuant thereto, and will permit access to its books, records,
accounts, other sources of information, and its facilities as may be
determined by the State highway department or the Bureau of Public
Roads to be pertinent to ascertain compliance with such Regulations,
orders and instructions. Where any information required of a contractor is
in the exclusive possession of another who fails or refuses to furnish this
infonation, the contractor shall so certify to the State highway
or the Bureau of Public Roads u appropriate, and shall set
efforts it has made to obtain the information.
11ot1 for Noncom"1illnce: ln the event of the contractor's
cie with lhe nonclllcrimination provisions of this Section 11·3,
tile
department lhall lmpose such contract sanctions as it or
t1r.tj ...._ Of hblc lload1 may determine to be appropriate, iru:luding,

.,

laborer or mechanic employed in violation of the clause set forth in
paragraph 7, in the sum of $I 0 for each calendar day on which such
employee was required or permitted to work m excess of eight hou" or in
excess of the s:andacd workweek of forty hours without pa) ment of the
overtime wages required by the clause set forth in parapap!1 7.

9. Withholdin_g for unpaid
The State highway department contracting officer may withhold or
cause to be withheld from the contractor so much of the accrued payments
or advances as may be considered necessary to pay laborers and mechanics
employed by the contractor or any subcontractor on the work the full
amount of wages required by the contract. In the event of failure to pay
any laborer or mechanic employed or working on the site of the work, all
o.r part of the wages required by the contract, the State highway
department contracting.· officer may, after written notice to the contractor,
tlte aueh ·•oticm as may be necessary to cause the suspension of any
,_..
-.ce. or guarantee of fwads ua.tihuch violations have
-..
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Whenever the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to ec o
,
••••••
has found that the wages of any laborer or mechanic include the amount of
any costs reasonably anticipated in providing benefits under a plan or
program described in 'cction l (b)( 2)( I:!) of the Davis-Bacon Act. the

contractor shall maintain records which show that the commitment to
proVIde such benefits is enforceable. that the pian or program is financially
responsible, and that the plan or program has been communkated in
writing to the laborers or mechanics affected, and records which show the
costs anticipated or the actual cost incurred in providing such benefits.
c. The payrolls shall contain the following information:
(1) The employee's full name, addreu and social secqJtty.
number. (The employee's full name and social sec:um, DUndler>
·
·
appear on the fust payroll on which his name • ean.. tM : · ' ... · address need only be shown on the first
·· ,,
.
· · .
employee's name appeat1, 1mlul a
submittal to iet1e.ct tb.e
.. .,._, .. ,,.
.
.
'
.
. .
('t,.
-

!'.._

-re-quired ,vill be soli<.....fted through revisions of Form PR-47 with atteildant

expla1ution,.

4. Where subcontra..:tors are mvolved the L:ontractor shall submit either

a single report covering work both by
he may submit separate reports for
subcontractors.

and _all his subcontractors, or
hunseU and for each of his

VII. SUBLETTING OR ASSIGNING THE CONTRACT

VIII. SAFETY; ACCIDENT PREVENTION

